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 look to Theophrastean texts in one way or another for insight into Ar
 istotle's thought. But the volumes will be of interest as well to special
 ists in the various areas of philosophy who are curious about the history
 of their area: logicians, for instance, will enjoy browsing the eighty-six
 pages of translated reports in the logic section, and in so doing will be
 able to examine Theophrastus's additions to the Aristotelian canon of
 syllogistic forms, his advances in regard to the hypothetical syllogism,
 and his interesting forays into modal logic; students of ethics and moral
 psychology will find much to reflect on in the seventy-seven pages of
 translated reports in the ethics section; and so on. In some areas, the
 results of the search are disappointing (through no fault of the scholarly
 team, of course): almost nothing has turned up regarding the problems
 of the central books of Aristotle's Metaphysics, and very little on topics
 central to the Posterior Analytics. In other areas, for instance zoology,
 the reports will be more useful alongside some of the "Opuscula,"
 shorter essays which survive not (only) in quotation but in their own
 manuscript tradition and so are not included whole in these volumes.
 It is therefore good to hear that Project Theophrastus intends to prepare
 new editions of these in due course. Some of that work has already
 been done, and published, along with many Theophrastean studies of
 great value, in a series of Project Theophrastus conference proceedings
 called "Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities" (New Bruns
 wick: Transaction Books, 1983-).
 This two-volume set of reports will find their full use, of course, in
 conjunction with the commentary volumes to come (and ought to be
 ordered in anticipation of those volumes by librarians who might not
 otherwise want so specialized a collection of uninterpreted texts). But
 the two volumes should be celebrated for the contribution they already
 make, by themselves, to scholarship on ancient philosophy.?Allan
 Gotthelf, Trenton State College.
 Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York:
 The Free Press, 1992. xxiii + 418 pp. $24.95?In this book, Fuku
 yama seeks to provide affirmative answers to two fundamental ques
 tions: Has the ideal of liberal democracy effectively triumphed
 throughout the world so that we can now speak of the end of human
 kind's ideological development and thus the end of history? If so, is
 this a good thing?
 In Part 1, Fukuyama notes that any defensible conclusions concern
 ing the inevitable progress of world history in the direction of liberal
 democracy cannot be based simply on what might turn out to be a
 contingent (and reversible) historical fact, such as the crumbling of
 communism in 1989. In Part 2, Fukuyama suggests that some evidence
 for the inevitability and universal validity of liberal democracy may be
 provided by the ineluctable laws and implications of scientific devel
 opment. Modern natural science "is the only large-scale social activity
 that is by consensus cumulative and therefore directional" (p. 80). The
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 human mastery of nature that is made possible by natural science
 seems to lead inevitably to capitalism, which in turn seems to require
 liberal democracy as a form of political organization. But is there
 really a necessary link between scientific-economic progress and lib
 eral democracy? After all, it is quite conceivable that future capital
 istic regimes which successfully satisfy all of man's material desires
 might not be liberal democracies at all, but rather authoritarian in
 nature.
 In Part 3 Fukuyama begins to suggest that any viable argument for
 the inevitability of liberal democracy must not be based on scientific
 or economic imperatives alone, but must appeal to the human "struggle
 for recognition." The desire for recognition is the desire to be es
 teemed as a being that is free and not simply determined by one's an
 imal nature, and is manifest in man's willingness to risk his own com
 fort, material belongings, and even life, all for the sake of winning the
 respect of others. This desire for recognition is exhibited in the more
 noble human passions of patriotism, courage, generosity, and public
 spiritedness. Of course, the desire for recognition (which was dis
 cussed even by the ancient Greeks under name of thymos) can also be
 "the starting point for human conflict" (p. 182). In spite of this prob
 lem, Fukuyama argues that some form of moderated thymos can still
 be preserved in modern liberal society in safe and productive outlets.
 To justify this claim, Fukuyama turns to Hegel's notion of labor. La
 bor, for Hegel, does not simply satisfy man's material desires; labor
 also satisfies man's desire for recognition, since it is by transforming
 the natural world through his labor that man can discover his own
 freedom and capacity for overcoming his natural limitations. Human
 labor is objectified in the form of property, and so the recognition of
 property rights in liberal democracy is equally a recognition of man's
 thymotic nature.
 In Part 4 Fukuyama emphasizes that the survival of the modern liberal
 state does not simply allow, but even requires, the preservation of man's
 premodern, thymotic impulses: "no real-world society can long survive
 based on rational calculation and desire alone" (p. 215).
 In the fifth and final part of this book, Fukuyama addresses what he
 considers to be the greatest challenge to his thesis concerning the uni
 versal validity of liberal democracy. This challenge was articulated
 most powerfully by Nietzsche, who thought that liberalism's goal of "uni
 versalizing recognition" ultimately trivializes and devalues it. For Nietz
 sche, liberal democracy gives birth to a society where the typical citizen
 is the "last man" who no longer risks his own comfort and security for
 the sake of something greater than himself. In response to this chal
 lenge, Fukuyama assures us that "nature . . . will conspire" to preserve
 a substantial degree of man's thymotic nature, even within modern lib
 eral democracies (p. 315). Properly understood, "modern liberalism is
 not based on the abolition of the desire for recognition so much as on
 its transformation into a more rational form" (p. 337).
 Fukuyama's account is excellent for its demonstration of the acute
 relevance of philosophical ideas to what is at stake in modern liberal
 democracies. In showing the relevance of philosophical ideas, how
 ever, Fukuyama sometimes fails to plumb the depth of the ideas them
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 selves, or to do full justice to the philosophers who originally articulated
 them. Nevertheless, these shortcomings should not make one lose sight
 of what the book really seeks to show: that ideas have consequences.?
 Michael Baur, The Catholic University of America.
 Gillett, Grant. Representation, Meaning, and Thought. Oxford: Claren
 don Press, 1992. x + 213 pp. $49.95?Gillett's goal is to articulate and
 defend a view of the nature of thought that opposes the widely-accepted
 view that thoughts are internal states whose representational content is
 owed to causal connections with the environment, and whose interac
 tions play a part in the causation of behavior. According to Gillett,
 discourse about human mental activity is not about goings-on in an inner
 realm of causal representational states" (p. 99; my emphasis). What is
 it about, then? Gillett's alternative view rests entirely upon an account
 of the nature of concepts. "To grasp a concept is to master a principled
 way of responding to the world involving techniques of selected atten
 tion and directed search for criteria! information which reveals whether
 a presentation instances the concept in question" (p. 3). Two features
 of Gillett's account deserve emphasis. First, it turns out that responding
 to the world in "a principled way" is not merely a matter of responding
 to it in a defacto rule-governed way: "In using a concept, a thinker does
 not merely respond but can represent to himself the fact that a norm
 governs that response and is independent of it" (p. 68). Second, the
 responses to the world which concept-mastery requires are meant to be
 public responses, apparently taking the form (always?) of judgements
 expressed in a natural language.
 The centrality of this account of concepts to Gillett's overall project
 justifies some critical commentary. First, as one might fear of any ac
 count influenced by the later Wittgenstein, the account smells alarmingly
 behaviorist. Though Gillett does give the matter some intermittent dis
 cussion, he does not make it really clear either how his view avoids being
 behavioristic, or else what is wrong with traditional objections to be
 haviorism, objections which might at first blush seem to apply to his
 position. Second, Gillett never quite gets around to stating his account
 of what it is to have a thought; he tells us (perhaps) what it is to possess
 concepts, but not what the difference is between two people who pos
 sess the same concepts but who think different thoughts with them.
 Consequently, it never clearly emerges what "discourse about human
 mental activity" really is about, if it is not about "an inner realm."
 Chapter 1 contains Gillett's account of concepts. Chapter 2 develops
 an account of the self based on it. In Chapter 3, Gillett argues against
 the view that explanation of actions is causal explanation, and proposes
 an alternative: "to explain an action is to latch on to the rule-governed
 techniques an agent is using to deal with his environment at a given time"
 (p. 64). Chapter 4 outlines an account of how children acquire con
 cepts, and also suggests that connectionism supports his account of
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